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Executive Summary 
 
Across the United States, people of color continue to receive home loans on worse terms and at a 
higher cost than similarly situated white borrowers. National research also shows that people 
who live in segregated communities of color have born the brunt of the mortgage crisis, 
receiving a disproportionate rate of subprime loans and foreclosures. Communities in Crisis 
shows that these racially disparate trends hold true for the Twin Cities Metropolitan Region. 
Recent data provided under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) reveals strong racial 
disparities in mortgage lending in the Twin Cities. The data reveals that: 
 
• Income is No Insurance Against Mortgage Lending Disparities for People of Color 
Lenders are substantially more likely to deny loans to people of color, regardless of their 
income. For instance, high-income black, Hispanic and Asian applicants have higher denial 
rates for home purchase and refinance loans than low-income white applicants. 
 
• People of Color Are More Likely to Apply at a Subprime Lender Than Whites. 
Applicants of color, especially black and Hispanic applicants, are more likely to submit loan 
applications to subprime lenders than whites, regardless of their income. As a result, they 
disproportionately receive subprime loans. 
 
• People of Color, Even if They Are High Income, Are Much More Likely to Receive 
Subprime Loans Than Whites, Even Very Low Income Whites. 
High and very high income black and Hispanic borrowers are more likely to receive 
subprime loans than in any white income group. Income, of course, is not a perfect proxy for 
risks. However, the prime-subprime comparisons are dramatic. Unless characteristics other 
than income are strongly correlated with both race and risks, race by itself is still a very 
strong factor determining  the quality (and therefore the cost) of loans that borrowers receive. 
 
• Segregation Creates Unequal Access to Prime Lenders. 
Segregated neighborhoods of color in the Twin Cities are under-served by prime lending 
institutions. Both borrowers of color and white borrowers are less likely to apply with a 
prime lender in segregated neighborhoods of color than in predominately white 
neighborhoods, regardless of their income.  
 
• Unequal Access to Prime Lenders Contributes to Higher Denial Rates for People of 
Color 
People of color are more likely than whites to apply to near-prime or subprime lenders—
lenders with higher denial rates on average than prime lenders. In fact, half of the overall 
denial rate for people of color is due to their high application rates with near-prime and 
subprime lenders. This means that policies designed to increase access to prime lenders have 
the potential to reduce denial disparities.  
 
• Even When People of Color Access Prime Lenders, They Are More likely to be 
Denied Mortgage Loans. 
The other half of the difference in denial rates is due to the fact that non-white applicants 
were more likely to be denied than whites by all types of lenders—prime, near-prime and 
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subprime alike.  
 
• Fair Lending Laws Have Not Been Enforced 
Numerous laws, including the Fair Housing Act, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the 
Community Reinvestment Act outlaw and attempt to remedy racial disparities in home 
mortgage lending. Federal officials, however, did not aggressively pursue lending 
discrimination during the subprime boom. This lack of effective enforcement of fair lending 
laws meant that discriminatory or predatory lending behavior faced little threat of 
punishment.  
 
• Subprime Lending Disparities Became Foreclosure Disparities 
The observed disparities in lending patterns correlate with the impacts of the region’s 
foreclosure crisis. The enormous costs of foreclosures—to families who lose their homes as 
well as to cities and towns losing tax resources—have been greatest for communities of 
color. Both subprime lending rates and foreclosure rates have been highest in neighborhoods 
with the highest percentages of people of color. The impact of these patterns is especially 
notable in North Minneapolis, an area where prime lenders are noticeably under-represented 
and subprime lenders are significantly over-represented. 
 
Mortgage lenders should know that a failure to provide credit to people of color and 
communities of color on fair terms is illegal. And mortgage lenders should be very aware of the 
content of their lending practices. Yet, the Twin Cities data show lending disparities that are not 
easily explained by income differences between groups. Likewise, it is very clear that prime 
credit is not reaching the neighborhoods that need it the most; the segregated, high poverty 
neighborhoods that the Fair Housing Act was designed to eliminate.  
 
Forty years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act, banks are still disproportionately denying 
people of color prime, affordable mortgages. Lending disparities and the ensuing foreclosure 
crisis have not just cost people their homes. Homeownership has been the first step to building 
stability and wealth for Americans. This crisis has cost another generation of people of color the 
equal opportunity to join America’s middle class. Strong steps need to be taken to ensure equal 
access to credit and the promise of homeownership for people of color.  
 
Remedies: 
Removing disparities in the mortgage market will require a multi-faceted approach. The 
mortgage market needs to be carefully monitored for unfair disparities and fair lending laws need 
to be enforced. In order to do that, we need to expand and aggressively enforce the Community 
Reinvestment Act, establish a fair housing center in the Twin Cities to monitor all segments of 
the housing market, and the scope of the HMDA data set needs to be expanded. Finally, federal 
enforcement of Fair Lending Laws needs to resume in an aggressive manner.   
 
• Strengthen the Community Reinvestment Act  
People of color and people who live in segregated communities of color must have access to 
affordable credit from responsible lenders in order to build wealth and become part of the 
middle class. The CRA should be expanded to monitor and regulate the lending patterns of 
non-bank lending institutions. Rigorous enforcement of an expanded CRA will help provide 
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equal access to fair credit—a necessary first step in ensuring equal opportunity for all 
Americans. 
 
• Fund an On-going Regional Fair Housing Center.  
Regional Fair Housing Centers help ensure non-discrimination in housing, rental, and home 
lending markets through research and advocacy. An ongoing commitment to a fair housing 
center is needed to ensure that the grossly disparate impact of the ongoing crisis in the 
region’s housing and credit markets is not repeated in the future. 
 
• Expand HMDA  
While HMDA data has been steadily improved over the years, further improvements  could 
make it a much better source for monitoring discrimination in the mortgage market.  In 
particular, lenders should be required to report data on the credit status of borrowers, the 
interest rates for all loans, and race data for mail, phone and internet applications. Likewise 
secondary market participants should be required to report race data. 
 
Fair lending, however, in-and-of-itself will not end the threat of mortgage disparities for 
communities of color. Segregation creates concentrated poverty, makes it more difficult for 
people of color to access prime lenders, and creates easy targets for predatory lenders. 
Monitoring and enforcement of fair lending laws are an important first step in attacking the root 
problem, racial segregation. In the end, the entire Twin Cities region needs to work aggressively 
to end segregation in order to create equal opportunity for all of its residents. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The effects of the mortgage foreclosure crisis on the economy and on the stability of banking 
institutions is well publicized and potential solutions to the crisis are hotly debated. Missing from 
much of the debate, however, is an analysis of the disproportionate impact of the foreclosure 
crisis on people of color.1  
 
The impact of the foreclosure crisis on poor neighborhoods and communities of color in the 
Twin Cities highlights how much race still matters in home mortgage lending. Studies of housing 
markets have shown that mortgage institutions have continued to disinvest in neighborhoods that 
are predominately people of color.2 These trends mimic past patterns of bank and government 
sanctioned redlining of neighborhoods, where lenders withheld credit from segregated 
neighborhoods—a practice that helped shape the geography of segregation and concentrated 
poverty in the U.S.3 One difference between the mortgage market 30 years ago and the mortgage 
market today is that non-bank lenders, usually subprime or predatory lenders, rushed in to fill the 
mortgage market void in communities of color. This meant that more mortgage dollars were 
available to people of color than in the past, but this nonbank credit was much more expensive 
than the prime credit that was more available in white communities.   
 
Today, the problem created by disparate lending is three-fold. First, people of color are 
disproportionately less likely to receive prime loans than whites, while people of color are more 
likely to receive subprime loans than similarly situated whites. Recent increases in subprime 
lending combined with racial disparities means that people of color are more likely to experience 
predatory lending, equity stripping, and foreclosure. Second, because subprime lending is tied to 
an increased risk of foreclosure, poor neighborhoods and communities of color are bearing the 
brunt of the foreclosure crisis and recent gains in homeownership are threatened.4 Third, because 
foreclosures are concentrated in areas where people of color live, the mortgage crisis has eroded 
urban property tax bases, adding to fiscal woes in cities and older suburbs.5    
 
It is no accident that high rates of subprime lending and foreclosures are concentrated in 
segregated neighborhoods of color – and the reason for this disparity is not simply individual 
discrimination against people of color. Instead, racial and economic segregation set the stage for 
concentrated subprime lending and facilitate discrimination against neighborhoods. A major 
factor leading to high subprime lending rates in these areas is the relative lack of access to credit 
in segregated neighborhoods.  
 
Despite the Community Reinvestment Act’s mandate to provide equal access to credit across 
communities, people who live in segregated communities are substantially less likely to have 
                                                 
1 Special thanks to Professors Prentiss Cox, Claire Hill, and Brett McDonnell from the University of Minnesota Law 
School, Amber Hawkins, Galen Robinson and Colleen Daley of Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid, Micheal Grover of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, and Kari Rudd for their assistance with this project.  
2 See National Community Reinvestment Coalition, 2007, Are Banks on the Map? An Analysis of Bank Branch 
Location in Working Class and Minority Neighborhoods, 15. 
3 Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, 1993. 
4 Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, 2005, 362-389 
5 Steve Brandt &  Randy Furst, Wave of foreclosures cost cities time and money, Star Tribune Nov. 11, 2007.  
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easy access to a bank branch with lending facilities than people who live in white-segregated 
communities. The lack of access means that people who live in segregated communities of color 
are much more likely to rely on mortgage brokers. Mortgage brokers who operate in these 
segregated communities are more likely to offer customers subprime loans, regardless of the 
person’s actual risk profile.  
 
The History of Racial Segregation and Housing Discrimination in the Mortgage Market 
In the United States, homeownership is the bulwark of a middle class life.6 For many Americans, 
their home’s equity is their primary source of wealth.7 This wealth can be leveraged in numerous 
ways including moving “up,” into better neighborhoods and homes, co-signing loans to ensure 
that one’s children become homeowners, and starting businesses.8 Racial discrimination has 
greatly reduced access for people of color and communities of color to these long-term wealth-
building benefits of home ownership.  
 
Limitations on homeownership by people of color used to be blatant. Racial covenants in 
housing deeds, prohibitions on the sale of homes to African Americans, red-lining of 
neighborhoods with people of color, and real estate appraisal guidelines that required appraisers 
to downgrade the value of homes in racially mixed neighborhoods all obviously denied blacks 
and other people of color access to homeownership and home equity. Overt racial discrimination 
had long-term impacts on both the accumulation of wealth in communities of color and of their 
trust in real estate institutions.9  
 
The Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 attempted to address 
this discrimination by prohibiting discrimination in home sales and in mortgage lending.10 
Nonetheless, banks, real estate appraisers, and realtors continued to redline neighborhoods, 
equating communities of color with decreased property values and “risky” loans.11 People in 
poor neighborhoods and people of color were consistently denied credit—making 
homeownership difficult, depressing property values and the tax base in inner cities.12  
 
In 1977, Congress passed the Community Revitalization Act (CRA), which was designed to 
eliminate redlining and encourage investment in impacted communities by “encourag[ing] 
regulated financial institutions to help meet the credit needs of their entire communities, 
including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with safe and sound 
operations.”13 While some banks did expand their lending operations into poor neighborhoods 
and communities of color, the CRA’s success in decreasing racial and neighborhood disparities 
in lending patterns is debatable.14  
                                                 
6 Henretta, 1984, 131-140. 
7 Justera et al., 1999 253-275. 
8 Aaronson, 2000, 356-369; Hurst et. al 1998, 1984–1994. 
9 Hylton and Rougaeu, 1996, 237-294. 
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619; 16 U.S.C. § 1691-1691(e). Larkin, 2007, 1617.   
11 Ibid.  
12 Shapiro, 2004, 108-109. 
13 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (2005). 
14 Compare Barr, 2005, 561 (arguing that the CRA has increased community development in low-income 
communities) with Macey and Miller, 1995, 293-94 (showing that the CRA has done more harm than good).  See 
also Alicia H Munnell et. al., 1996, 25-53. 
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Today, discrimination against people of color seeking to rent, buy, and insure houses continues 
to be an endemic problem across the United States. Pair testing studies continue to show racial 
steering by realtors in home buying and discrimination in home lending.15 While overt redlining, 
the complete denial of credit to communities of color, is less prevalent than it was forty years 
ago, research shows that racial minorities receive home loans on worse terms and at a higher cost 
than similarly situated white borrowers.16 Racially targeted predatory lending continues to deny 
people of color and the neighborhoods where they live equal access to stable homeownership. 
 
 
Home Mortgage Market Participants 
 
 
Home mortgage lenders are financial institutions, which often specialize in different types of home loan 
products. Prime lenders tend to offer lower interest rates and lower cost fees often through a branch 
location. Subprime lenders tend to offer higher interest loans and higher cost fees often through a 
mortgage broker. Borrowers in the subprime market are perceived to be the highest risk borrowers and are 
charged more for loans accordingly; although, blacks and Hispanics received more subprime loans than 
whites even when controlling for risk factors.17 
 
Mortgage brokers are non-bank entities that find potential customers, prepare paperwork from mortgage 
transactions and submit applications to lenders, which fund and underwrite the mortgage. Brokers receive 
compensation from origination fees and points that the borrower pays with the mortgage and often when 
the loan is funded.18 Brokers take very little risk in the outcome of the mortgage and have little incentive 
to achieve the best mortgage match for borrowers, increasing the chance of defaulting loans.19  
 
Secondary Market Participants are the parties that purchase loans from brokers and lenders, re-bundle 
the loans, and sell the repackaged mortgage securities on the bond market. The secondary mortgage 
market alleviated much of banks’ lending risks, arguably creating a moral hazard because the parties 
responsible for making loans are no longer directly responsible for ensuring loan repayment. Because 
each individual loan was packaged and re-packaged into bond pools, it was difficult for credit agencies to 
accurately rate the risk of these bonds. When the secondary mortgage market was thriving, these bonds 
were rated substantially higher than their actual value. Eventually these values plummeted leading to the 
current housing crisis. 
 
Loan Servicers are paid to collect payments from the borrower and to report when the loan is in default. 
The servicer remits portions of the payment to the trustee and investors that hold an interest in the loan. 
The servicer usually has a duty to collect the principal and interest and to use its own funds to make up 
the balance when the borrower does not make a payment in full.20 When faced with rising costs, some 
servicers engage in abusive practices that include improper fees, late fees, forcing insurance coverage that 
is not required. These practices may prompt foreclosure.21  
                                                 
15 Turner and Ross, 2003. 
16 Avery, Canner and Cook 2005;  Bocian, Ernst and Li, 2006;  Boehm, Thistle, and Schlottmann, 2006; Courchane, 
Surette, and Zorn, 2004;  Pennington-Cross et al., 2000. 
17 Bocian, Ernst and Li, 2006. 
18 Apgar and Calder, 2005, 4-5. 
19 Apgar and Calder, 2005, 6; Williams, Nesiba and Mcconnell, 2005, 184-187. 
20 Morse, 2003. 
21 Eggert, 2007, 286-287; Eggert, 2003, 758-761. 
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II.  The Mortgage Market, Subprime Lending, and  Foreclosures in 
 Segregated Communities of Color  
 
Mortgage foreclosures have devastated local and national economies, contributing to one of the 
worst recessions in living memory. The initial impact of foreclosures centered in low-income 
communities of color, and the collapse of the housing market has hurt low-income people of 
color the most. The Center for Responsible Lending estimated that one out of eight subprime 
loans made between 1998 and 2004 foreclosed within five years, and the risk of foreclosure has 
increased dramatically since that time. Subprime loans made between 2005 and 2006 have an 
estimated one in five chance of foreclosure.22 This crisis has hit the Twin Cities region hard. In 
2005, Minnesota’s foreclosure rate was the highest in state history.23 
 
A.  Prime, Subprime and Predatory Lending in Communities of Color 
 
Prime and Subprime Lending 
Prime loans are the standard home loans that have allowed high rates of homeownership and 
housing mobility in the United States. Subprime loans have higher interest rates than prime loans 
and often contain additional features and costs that are absent in prime loans. Subprime loan 
features can include prepayment penalties; adjustable rate mortgages where interest rates are 
adjusted periodically; interest only loans, where the borrower only pays for the interest on the 
principal of the loan; and balloon payment mortgages, where interest rates climb towards the end 
of the loan. In theory, subprime loans have higher costs because of lenders’ assessment of the 
riskiness of lending to borrowers. Lenders assess loan applicants' employment histories, 
incomes, loan cost to home value ratios, and credit scores when determining the creditworthiness 
of borrowers.  
 
Prime-eligible borrowers of color often receive subprime loans.24 While the use of objective 
lending data, such as FICO and other credit scores,25 was supposed to eliminate non-risk-based 
disparities, unexplained racial disparities continue.26 For example, one empirical study found that 
after controlling for credit-worthiness, African Americans were 31 percent more likely and 
                                                 
22 Ellen Schloemer et al., 2006, 9-16. 
23 Wood, 2007, 22. 
24 Avery, Canner and Cook, 2005; Bocian, Ernst and Li, 2006;  Boehm, Thistle and Schlottmann, 2006; Courchane 
Surette and Zorn, 2004;  Pennington-Cross et al., 2000. 
25 Banks often use Fair Isaac’s Corporation (FICO) scores to determine whether applicants are eligible for prime or 
subprime loans. FICO uses statistical models to attempt to predict the likelihood that an applicant will default on a 
loan by comparing the borrower to similar borrowers in the market and tracing loan outcomes. FICO scores vary 
from 300 to 900. A FICO score of 662 is a common cutoff between prime and subprime mortgages, and a score of 
640 is the common cutoff for near-prime mortgages, which cost less than subprime loans, but more than prime 
loans. See Fellows and Mabanta 2007, 16. Lenders also often use other credit scores, such as Equifax or Experian, 
which generate credit scoring using different formulas in conjunction with FICO to establish loan eligibility. 
Because the models are proprietary, it is impossible to know whether they contain discriminatory variables, such as 
the racial composition of a neighborhood. Though there has been little documentation about whether automated 
mortgage services have used discriminatory variables in their software products, life insurance and realtor 
institutions have used neighborhood racial typologies when marketing life insurance and directing home buyers into 
prospective neighborhoods. See Metzger, 2001, 16-19.  
26 Avery, Canner, and Cook, 2005; Bocian, Ernst, and Li, 2006;  Boehm, Thistle, and Schlottmann, 2006; 
Courchane, Surette, and Zorn, 2004;  Pennington-Cross et al., 2000. 
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Hispanics were 45 percent more likely than whites to receive higher cost loans, and that African 
Americans were 35 percent more likely than whites to receive high cost refinance loans.27 
 
Segregated neighborhoods of color, neighborhoods where more than 50 percent of the residents 
are people of color, receive disproportionate numbers of subprime loans.28 Previously redlined 
neighborhoods, which are still underserved by traditional lenders, are new markets for subprime 
lenders. Further, people who live in these segregated neighborhoods are likely to have limited 
mortgage market knowledge and are likely to have previously received subprime loans, both 
strong risk factors for subprime lending.29 The Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard 
University summed up this problem of access inequalities and unequal information in the home 
mortgage markets:  
 
The bewildering array of mortgage products combined with the various available combinations of 
points and fees and aggressive marketing tactics with “too good to be true” offers can make 
shopping for a mortgage an overwhelming process for even the most sophisticated borrower. 
Indeed, the lack of readily available data on the price of alternative mortgage products puts the 
consumer at a distinct disadvantage in negotiating with a mortgage broker who has ready access to 
this information. . . The growing use of mortgage brokers, the lack of effective regulatory 
oversight, the lack of readily available mortgage pricing data have combined to reinforce a dual 
market where some borrowers pay more for mortgage credit and/or receive less favorable 
treatment (or even abusive treatment) than other similarly situated and equally creditworthy 
borrowers. 30 
 
This unequal access to prime lenders and unequal information networks means that not all prime 
or subprime mortgage decisions are purely risk-based. When people apply to subprime lenders, 
their likelihood of getting a subprime mortgage can be independent of their income or credit risk 
because subprime lenders issue mostly subprime loans. A prime-eligible borrower who lacks 
access to good information about mortgage pricing can easily end up with the most expensive 
loan that they will accept, rather than the best loan their credit deserves.  
    
Predatory Lending 
Although not all subprime loans are predatory, most predatory loans are found in the subprime 
market. Predatory lending has been defined as a "syndrome of loan abuses that benefit mortgage 
brokers, lenders, and securitizers to the serious detriment of borrowers."31 According to Engel 
and McCoy (2007) loan characteristics that define predatory lending include: Loans that are 
explicitly structured to harm borrowers, for instance steering prime loan qualifiers into subprime 
loans, rent seeking, where the value of interest and fees collected by a lender outweigh the risk of 
lending to an applicant, illegal fraud and deception, non-fraudulent forms of non-transparency, 
including hidden price sheets, loan requirements that waive legal redress, lending discrimination, 
                                                 
27 Bocian, Ernst, and Li, 2006, 16-18. 
28 Calem, Gillen, and Watcher, 2004; Immergluck and Wiles, 1999; National Center for Community Revitalization, 
2003. 
29 Courchane et al., 2004. 
30 Apgar et al., 2004, 5.  
31 Engel and McCoy (2007), 106. 
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and servicing abuses.32 As one might expect, research has shown that there are often predatory 
terms on mortgages that have gone into foreclosure.33  
 
The Community Reinvestment Act 
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was enacted in 1977 to help ensure access to prime 
credit in low-income communities. The act was passed in response to evidence of persistent 
redlining of minority communities. The act mandates federal oversight of federally regulated 
banks’ lending patterns, and authorizes federal regulators to hold-up mergers and expansions if 
banks do not extend access to mortgages in low and moderate-income census tracts.34 While the 
CRA has been blamed for the mortgage meltdown by spurring subprime and predatory lending in 
communities of color, the CRA was not behind the steep increases in subprime lending.35  
 
Nonbank institutions not covered by the CRA were responsible for the vast majority of the 
increase in subprime lending. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Chairwoman Sheila Bair 
testified that “only one in four higher-priced first mortgage loans were made by CRA-covered 
banks during the hey-day years of subprime mortgage lending. The rest were made by private 
independent mortgage companies and large bank affiliates not covered by CRA rules.”36 
 
The federal failure to effectively enforce the CRA and guarantee credit-worthy borrowers in low-
income communities access to good credit, however, may have worsened the foreclosure crisis.37 
The failure of prime lenders to have a significant market presence in communities of color 
created significant market opportunities for subprime lenders who faced virtually no competition 
from prime lenders in these neighborhoods.    
 
B.  Homeownership in Communities of Color and the Rise of the Subprime Mortgage 
 Market 
 
In the 1990s, public and private institutions took significant steps to close the homeownership 
gap between people of color and whites, recognizing that the persistent gap was a major 
contributor to wealth disparities.38 Public policies that encouraged lenders to extend credit to 
people of color and the subsequent rise in homeownership rates for people of color are often 
                                                 
32 Engel and McCoy (2007), 106. Loan characteristics that are explicitly designed to harm borrowers include 
packing loans with undisclosed fees, inflated appraisals, underwriting that does not consider a borrower’s ability to 
repay, inflating the borrowers' income and coercive and fraudulent home repair schemes. Other predatory 
characteristics include lenders' failure to disclose terms to borrowers, pressure and intimidation of borrowers, 
fraudulent marketing and arbitrary provisions that ensure favorable outcomes for lenders in case of foreclosure. 
Bourassa, 2003. Some studies include certain loan features as indications of predatory lending including prepayment 
penalties, balloon payments, adjustable rate mortgages and interest only loans. Rivera et al. 2008, 9-11; National 
Community Reinvestment Coalition, 2002, 9-10. 
33 Bourassa 2003; Engel and McCoy 2008, 91; Shloemer, 2006; Stock 2001. 
34 12 U.S.C. 2901.  
35 See, for example, Jerry Bowyer, “Don't Blame the Markets,” New York Sun, April 18, 2008. 
36 Remarks by FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair Before the Consumer Federation of America, December 4, 2008. 
37 Traiger & Hinkley LLP. (study showing that large metropolitan regions with higher concentrations of CRA 
covered banks had lower foreclosure rates than regions with lower concentrations of CRA covered banks). 
38 Engel and McCoy, 2008; Rivera et al., 2008, 6-7, Listokin and Wyly, 2000, 599-600. 
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blamed for the foreclosure crisis.39 The relationship between increasing homeownership and 
increasing subprime lending, however, is not straightforward – homeownership began increasing 
for people of color before subprime lending occupied a significant share of the mortgage market. 
 
A strong economy and increased investment in underserved areas set the conditions for steady 
increases in homeownership for people of color consistently between the mid-1990s and 2006. 
The homeownership gap between whites and people of color, however, did not close. Whites 
still have homeownership rates 20 to 25 percentage points greater than blacks or Hispanics, a gap 
that has not changed with growth in underserved markets (Chart 1). 
   
 
 
The increase in homeownership for people of color started in the early 1990s and held steady 
through 2005. The United States Department of Housing and Human Services (HUD) estimated 
that 80 percent of the subprime loans made in the 1990s were refinances to already existing 
homeowners.40 The high-cost subprime market took off around 2003 (Chart 2), well after 
minority homeownership began to climb.41 This means that it is possible to increase stable 
minority homeownership without relying on subprime lending.  Further, there is no inevitable 
connection between minority homeownership and increasing foreclosures. Before subprime 
lending began to dominate the mortgage market in low-income areas, people of color were 
                                                 
39 See, for example, John R. Lott, Jr., “Analysis: Reckless Mortgages Brought Financial Market to Its Knees,” 
foxnews.com, September 18, 2008. (Arguing that lending practices promoting minority homeownership mandated by 
the Fed and encouraged by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac led to problems at subprime financial institutions such as 
Countrywide and Bear Stearns.) 
40 National Fair Housing Alliance, 2008, 21. 
41 Other data shows that the share of mortgage loans held by blacks began increasing rapidly even before the rapid 
increases in the share of subprime loans. Calculated shares from table 2 in Williams, Nesiba, and McConnell, 2005, 
195. 
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successfully purchasing houses with more stable prime loans. Moreover, research conducted by 
the Boston Federal Reserve suggests that many subprime loans did not result in significantly 
increased minority homeownership, but rather an increase in churning of subprime loans and 
refinances in segregated urban areas.42 This means that increased subprime lending often resulted 
in a fast-paced turnover and foreclosure of homes already owned by people of color.  
 
The New Mortgage Market and New Forms of Discrimination 
The process of home lending has changed dramatically over the last few decades, including the 
growth of mortgage brokers, automated underwriting, and loan securitization. While each of 
these changes potentially increased peoples’ access to mortgage loans, they may also have 
increased the potential for hidden discrimination in lending, obscured credit discrimination 
against communities of color, and created a complex financial market that encouraged high-risk, 
predatory lending.  
 
These changes in the mortgage market mean that by-and-large, borrowers no longer acquire 
loans from their neighborhood bank. Even when borrowers borrow from their neighborhood 
lender, oftentimes that bank does not make the decision about whether to extend credit or hold 
onto the loan once it is made. Instead loans, and their attendant risk, are sold on the secondary 
market.  
 
The demise of the direct connection between borrowers and banks went hand-in-hand with the 
dramatic increase in mortgage transactions consummated though mortgage brokers.43 In 2004, 65 
                                                 
42 Gerardi and Willen, 2008. 
43 A national study of home lending between 1999 and 2000 found that 68 percent of borrowers of color received 
loans from a broker compared to 38 percent of whites. Apgar and Calder 2005; 4-5; Rivera, 2008; Kellie K. Kim-
Sung and Sharon Hermanson, 2003.  
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percent of all mortgage transactions involved a mortgage broker.44 Large lenders that dominated 
the mortgage market in the 1990s were often ill-equipped to establish direct relationships with 
underserved borrowers and often relied on relationships with other lenders and local non-profit 
organizations to foster those contacts. Although this helped establish loan counseling and long-
term support for borrowers, as automated underwriting increased, these arrangements became 
less commonplace.45 
 
This disconnect between borrowers and the holder of the mortgage loan both fueled the growth 
of high-cost, high-risk lending in communities of color and made it difficult for homeowners 
saddled with impossible loan payments to renegotiate reasonable loan terms with the investment 
banks that owned their mortgages. This separation also made it easier for mortgage market 
participants to separate themselves from the financial consequences of predatory lending and 
made it more difficult for borrowers to connect subprime or predatory mortgage terms with the 
systematic, discriminatory conduct of any one player in the mortgage market.46  
 
 
                                                 
44 Missouri Association of Mortgage Brokers, http://www.mamb.net/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=26. 
45 Listokin and Wyly, 2000, 633. 
46 For example, while mortgage brokers locate borrowers, lenders usually provide the terms of loans and the terms 
of the broker’s cut of the loan’s profits. Loan originators then sell loans to entities that bundle the loans into pools 
and resell them on the secondary market. Secondary market purchasers of predatory loans encouraged predatory 
lending by purchasing subprime or predatory loans that they knew or should have known were the result of  brokers 
targeting neighborhoods of color. Likewise, secondary market participants directly participated in discriminatory 
lending through subsidiaries that engaged in racially targeted predatory lending practices, and underwriting loans in 
ways that encouraged racially targeted predatory lending. Debbie Bocian, Keith Ernst and Wei Li, 2006, 197 F. 
Supp.2d 1357 (D. Ga. 2002); Complaint, Rodriguez v. Bear Sterns, CV 1816 (D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2007); Comptroller 
of the Currency, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Advisory Letter 2003-3, Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending 
Practices in Brokered and Purchased Loans, 2 (2003). 
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III. Twin Cities Mortgage Lending Patterns 
 
Prior work by other researchers shows that the Twin Cities metropolitan area has had some of the 
nation’s worst racial disparities in mortgage outcomes, particularly in home purchasing.47 The 
region has typical levels of subprime lending for a U.S. metropolitan area. However, racial 
disparities in mortgage lending are stark—in 2006 the Twin Cities region had the seventh largest 
difference among 63 large metros between white and African American borrowers in the 
percentage of home purchase loans that were subprime. For Hispanics, the difference was 
eleventh largest.48 
 
This section analyzes home lending patterns in the Twin Cities in more detail to reveal how 
lending activities and outcomes varied by race, income and neighborhoods between 2004 and 
2006. This period was selected because it represented the largest volume of subprime lending 
nationally.49  
 
The analysis of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) loan data shows large disparities 
across racial groups in access to prime lenders and prime loans. The disparities cannot be 
explained simply by income differences or by different mixes of loan types (prime versus 
subprime). The data show, for instance, that denial rates for home mortgage loans for high-
income black, Hispanic and Asian applicants exceeded those for low-income white applicants. 
Denial rates are also greater for non-white applicants regardless of the type of lender (prime, 
near-prime or subprime). 
 
The analysis also assesses the relationship between race, subprime lending and foreclosures in 
Twin Cities' neighborhoods and shows that neighborhoods with large shares of people of color—
in both central cities and suburbs—are much more likely to have high foreclosure rates than 
white neighborhoods. Subprime lending and foreclosure rates skyrocket in neighborhoods where 
minority shares are greater than 40 or 50 percent. 
 
Lending patterns in North Minneapolis illustrate the magnitude of the problem in the hardest-hit 
parts of the region. North Minneapolis has been hit harder than any other part of the region by 
the foreclosure crisis. The data show that at least part of the reason for this is that the area is 
markedly underserved by prime lending institutions and over-served by near-prime and subprime 
lenders. Near-prime and subprime loans are more risky and costly and, consequently, are much 
more likely to lead to foreclosure than prime loans. 
 
 
A.  Analysis of Twin Cities Lending Patterns 
 
This section examines mortgage outcomes by race, income, and geography in order to assess the 
magnitude of disparities in lending for both individuals and neighborhoods in the Twin Cities 
                                                 
47 ACORN, 2007, Foreclosure Exposure. 
48 ACORN, 2007. The comparison is for the 63 metropolitan areas and metropolitan divisions with over 1 million 
people included in the study. 
49 Using this three year period also provides a data set large enough to cross-tabulate lending characteristics at the 
neighborhood (census tract) level with reliable results. 
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metropolitan area. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) for 2004-2006 and 2007 foreclosure 
data are used to examine differences in lending outcomes and to assess the relationships between 
race, subprime lending and foreclosures. Denial rates for mortgage applications are used to 
highlight how outcomes differ by race, even when accounting for variations in income.  
Differences in application and lending rates in prime and subprime markets are used as indicators 
of how access to different types of lenders varies systematically by race and neighborhood. 
Finally, foreclosure data highlight how these lending patterns translate into dramatically 
disparate effects on different types of neighborhoods and borrowers. 
 
 
Race, Income and Mortgage Denials 
The Twin Cities lending data show large mortgage denial disparities by race. People of color are 
denied home purchase and refinancing loans at much higher rates than white applicants, even 
after controlling for income. Chart 3 shows these differences for home purchase loans. Overall, 
loan denial rates are highest for black applicants, followed by Hispanics, Asians, other races and 
whites. In general, denial rates are lower for applicants with higher incomes, regardless of race—
each of the lines in Chart 3 slopes downward on average. 
 
However, the most striking results in the chart are the differences across races. Denial rates are 
higher for black, Hispanic and Asian applicants than for whites, regardless of income. Very high 
income black, Hispanic and Asian applicants (applicants with incomes more than $157,000 per 
year) show denial rates higher than whites in the lowest-income category (less than $39,250 per 
year). The disparities are greatest for black borrowers. The denial rate for blacks with incomes 
above $157,000 was 25%, while it was just 11% for Whites making less than $39,250.50 
                                                 
50 Statistical analysis of the HMDA data confirm that race and income each have independent effects on denial rates 
after controlling for the other. A logistic regression of the likelihood that an application was denied on the 213,680 
Data and Methods 
 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data was used to assess home mortgage lending activity in 
the Twin Cities between 2004 and 2006. HMDA was enacted in 1975 by the U.S. congress in 
response to the exclusion of racial minorities in the marketing and lending of home mortgages.  
HMDA requires a large majority of lending institutions (about 80%) to report their loan application 
transactions, which are then collected and recorded in an electronic database by the U.S. Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). 
 
HMDA records show mortgage applications that include the race and income of the applicants, the 
purpose of the loan, the property location, the outcome, and the name of the mortgage lender. HMDA 
was amended in 2004 to address the increasing high cost loan activity in the mortgage market by 
flagging loans that are three percentage points above the prevailing treasury rate.   
 
Other HMDA information include whether the mortgage was a first or second lien mortgage; if the 
loan request was for an owner or rental unit; whether the mortgaged property was a 1-4 unit, 
manufactured or multifamily property; and if the loan was a conventional or government-backed loan. 
Only records for first-lien, conventional, 1-4 unit owner properties were included for this analysis. 
HMDA records that were determined by FFIEC to have edit quality issues were excluded.  Records 
with missing data for the race of the mortgage applicant were excluded for comparisons of mortgage 
outcomes of different racial groups. 
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Income is not a perfect proxy for credit-worthiness. For instance, lenders also use credit scores to 
judge risks. It is possible that non-white and white applicants with identical incomes have 
different credit scores on average. This could happen if white incomes were more stable over 
time, for instance. However, other studies have shown that controlling for credit scores or other 
factors does not eliminate racial differences in credit markets51 and the differences in Chart 3 are 
stark. It is hard to view differences of this magnitude as anything except indicators of real 
differences in the way the credit markets treat applicants of color. 
 
 
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2004-2006 HMDA 
 
Denial rates for refinancing loans show a similar pattern (Chart 4). Overall, refinance 
applications are denied more often than home purchase applications and denial rates do not vary 
as dramatically by race. However upper-income blacks were still likely as or more likely to be 
denied a refinance loan than lower-income whites. Black applicants in the highest income group 
had refinance denial rates of 32 percent. This was about twice the denial rate for upper-income 
whites and six points greater than the 26 percent denial rate for the lowest-income white 
applicants. Black applicants in the lowest income category had extraordinarily high denial 
rates—43 percent, or 1.6 times the rate for lower-income whites. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
purchase loan applications in 2004-2006 HMDA data for the Twin Cities shows this. Non-white applicants—
measured by separate categories for black, Hispanic, Asian and other—show higher denial rates than whites after 
controlling for inflation-adjusted income (which is negatively associated with likelihood of denial, as expected), 
inflation-adjusted amount of the loan, type of lender (prime or not), gender of the applicant, minority share of the 
census tract of the home, and median family income of the census tract. An identical regression using data for the 
253,370 refinance applications in the data set gives the same conclusions. 
51 Avery, Canner and Cook 2005; Bocian, Ernst, and Li, 2006;  Boehm, Thistle, and Schlottmann, 2006; Courchane 
Surette, and Zorn, 2004; Dietrich, 2005; . Munnell et. al., 1996; Pennington-Cross et al., 2000. 
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The geography of mortgage denial rates reflects these patterns. Map 1 shows mortgage (home 
purchase and refinance loans, combined) denial rates across the region and Map 2 shows the 
percentage of applications that are from people of color.52 The highest mortgage denial rates 
between 2004 and 2006 were concentrated in neighborhoods with the highest percentages of 
applications from people of color. The neighborhoods with the highest mortgage denial rates 
were largely in North Minneapolis, the adjacent northern suburbs, south-central Minneapolis, 
and central St. Paul (Map 1). Mortgage denial rates in these neighborhoods exceeded 25 percent 
and the correlation with non-white application rates (Map 2) is clear. The only other areas with 
high denial rates were in the periphery of the metro, places with few applicants, most of whom 
were low-income whites.53 
 
Race, Loan Types and Denial Rates 
Mortgage lending disparities by race in the Twin Cities can be broken down into two parts. One 
part reflects the fact that denial rates differ by race regardless of the type of loan. For instance, 
black applicants may have higher denial rates for all types of loans—prime, near-prime and sub-
prime. This can be called the “rate effect.” The other part reflects the fact that denial rates differ 
by loan type and different races use different mixes of loans. If, for instance, subprime loans 
have much higher denial rates than prime loans and black applicants are much more likely than  
                                                 
52 Similar spatial patterns were found for home purchase loans and refinance loans. Maps 1, 2, 4 and 5 therefore 
show total rates regardless of the purpose of the loans. 
53 Tracts with high denial rates in the outskirts of the metro had substantially fewer people applying for loans 
compared to other tracts in the metro. For instance, tracts with high denial rates (>19.4%) in the periphery of the 
metro in Chisago, Isanti, Pierce, Saint Croix, Sherburne and Wright Counties had 12,291 mortgage applicants 
compared to 89,195 in other high denial tracts in the core of the region. 
 
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2004-2006 HMDA 
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Map 1: MINNEAPOLIS - SAINT PAUL REGIONHome Mortgage Denial Rates by Census Tract, 2004 - 2006
Only conventional first-lien mortgage applications for owner-occupied and 1-4 family unit homes are used for the calculation of the rate.  Mortgages purchased by institutions were not included in the calculation.
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Note:  Census Tracts with "No data" hadfewer than 25 mortgage applications.
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Map 2: MINNEAPOLIS - SAINT PAUL REGIONPercentage of Mortgage Applications that arePeople of Color by Census Tract, 2004 - 2006
Home mortgagors that are People of Color include all persons except single race non-Hispanic white mortgage originators (i.e. borrowers) and co-originators.Only conventional first-lien mortgage applications for owner-occupied and 1-4 family unit homes are used for the calculation of the non-approval rate.  Mortgages purchased by institutions were not included in the calculation.
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Note:  Census Tracts with "No data" hadfewer than 25 mortgage applications.
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whites to use sub-prime loans, then blacks might have higher denial rates simply because of their 
loan mix. This can be called the “mix effect.” The distinction is helpful because the two types of 
disparity have different causes and remedies. A substantial rate effect most likely reflects that 
potential borrowers are treated differently depending on their race, while a large mix effect 
suggests that access to different types of lenders varies by race.  
 
This section will first examine how loan mixes vary across races. This comparison is important 
for two reasons. To some extent, loan mixes reflect access to different types of lenders, so the 
mix is of interest in and of itself. The loan mix also can be combined with denial rate data to 
break out the “rate” and “mix” effects. 
 
The ability to obtain a prime loan is affected by how accessible a prime lending bank is to a 
potential borrower. Mortgage lenders in the Twin Cities tend to specialize either in prime 
lending—banks issuing more than 90 percent prime loans—or subprime lending—banks issuing 
more than 50 percent subprime loans. 
 
In the Twin Cities, home purchasers of color were much more likely than whites to apply with a 
subprime lender (Tables 1a and 1b).54 For example, 55 percent of blacks applied with a subprime 
lender for a home loan, compared to only 12 percent of whites. Subprime shares were 42 percent 
for Hispanics and 38 percent for American Indians (table 1a). If people of color had applied to 
prime home purchase lenders at the same rate as whites there would have been an additional 
5,033 blacks, 2,784 Hispanics and 2,462 Asians applying with a prime lender. 
 
A similar pattern exists with refinance applications. Whites were substantially more likely than 
non-whites to apply to a prime lender. For instance, nearly half of white applicants (46 percent) 
applied for a refinance loan at a prime lender compared to just 29 percent with subprime lenders. 
On the other hand less than 20 percent of black applicants applied with prime lenders compared 
to more than 50 percent with subprime lenders. If people of color had applied to prime refinance 
lenders at the same rate as whites there would have been an additional 4,050 blacks, 1,928 
Hispanics and 914 Asians applying with prime lenders. 
 
Prime lenders are underrepresented in neighborhoods with large shares of people of color. Racial 
segregation limits access to prime lenders. A study by the National Community Reinvestment 
Coalition found that the Twin Cities ranked last of the 25 large metropolitan areas in the study in 
the availability of bank branch locations in predominantly minority census tracts (Table 2).55 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 Lenders with less than 10 percent of loans subprime are designated "prime lenders"; lenders whose total loans 
were 10 to 50 percent subprime are "near-prime lenders"; and lenders whose total loans were more than 50% 
subprime are "subprime lenders". 
55 For Twin Cities' census tracts with over 50 percent minority there were 13,473 persons per branch location, 
compared to 3,729 persons per branch location in tracts with less than 50 percent minority. National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition, 2007, p. 15. 
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Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2004-2006 HMDA 
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The importance of the “mix effect” depends on how denial rates differ by loan type. The bottom 
row of Table 3 shows very clearly that denial rates are higher on average in the subprime and 
near-prime markets than in the prime market. The overrepresentation of borrowers of color in the 
subprime markets explains at least some of the overall higher denial rates for people of color 
shown in Charts 3 and 4. However, only a portion of the disparities can be explained this way. 
Table 3 also shows that denial rates are substantially higher for people of color for each type of 
lender, including prime lenders. For instance, home purchase loan denial rates for blacks 
exceeded those for whites by nine points (13 percent compared to four percent) with prime 
lenders, or by more than 3 to 1. The difference was 14 points (or 2 to 1) for near-prime lenders 
and eight points (or 1.4 to 1) for sub-prime lenders.  
  22
 
 
Disparities are also evident for refinance loans. For these types of loans, denial rates for black 
applicants were 14 points higher (or nearly 3 to 1) for prime lenders and eight points higher for 
near-prime and sub-prime lenders. 
 
Both the mix and rate effects are potentially important. In fact, analysis shows that each effect 
explains roughly half of the total difference in denial rates for home purchase loans between 
whites and each of the other three races.56 This means that policies to deal with both types of 
racial disparities are necessary—strategies to promote equal access to prime lending as well as 
policies which insure that potential borrowers for all types of loans are treated equally.  
 
Subprime Lending Rates by Race and Income 
Given that such a significant proportion of the overall racial disparities in denial rates are the 
result of the mix of lenders that different races utilize, it is important to understand why so many 
non-white borrowers end up in the subprime market. If, for instance, they end up with these 
kinds of loans because their lower incomes make them greater risks, then the policy implications 
are substantially different than if they end up with subprime lenders and loans simply because of 
their race. 
 
Income alone does not account for racial disparities in participation in the prime and subprime 
markets. In the Twin Cities, blacks are five times more likely to receive a subprime home 
purchase loan than whites, followed by Hispanics (a 4 to 1 ratio) and Asians (a 2 to 1 ratio). For 
refinances, blacks are 2.5 times more likely to receive a subprime loan than whites, followed by 
Hispanics (a 2 to 1 ratio) and Asians (a 1.25 to 1 ratio). Further, Chart 5 shows that high and very 
high income black or Hispanic borrowers are more likely to have subprime loans than in any 
                                                 
56 The analysis, known as shift-share analysis, makes two calculations. The first is an estimate of the total denial rate 
that each race would have if it had the average mix of loan types combined with its actual denial rates for each loan 
type. The second is an estimate of the total denial rate that each race would have if it had its actual mix of loans 
combined with average denial rates for each loan type. Each of the estimates can be compared to each race’s actual 
total denial rate to show how much of the differences between races are due to the mix and rate effects. The shift-
share analysis is available from the authors on request. 
 
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2004-2006 HMDA 
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white income group. The same is true for refinancing loans (Chart 6). 
 
As noted in the discussion of denial rates, income is not a perfect proxy for risks. However, the 
prime-subprime comparisons are dramatic. Unless characteristics other than income are strongly 
correlated with both race and risks, race by itself is still a very strong factor determining the 
quality (and therefore the cost) of loans that borrowers receive. In other words, discriminatory 
practices could very well be at work in these markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2004-2006 HMDA 
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Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2004-2006 HMDA 
 
 
Lending Patterns by Neighborhood Type 
Neighborhoods in the Twin Cities are highly segregated by race. This creates potential for 
geographic disparities in two ways.  Entire neighborhoods in the core cities and inner suburbs 
with high non-white shares of residents are likely to show much higher than average rates of 
subprime loans because they are populated by racial groups most likely to receive those types of 
loans. Even more important, however, is the possibility that loan applicants will be treated 
differently by the lending market depending on the neighborhood they live in, rather than based 
on the individual merits of their application. 
 
The data in fact show that there is a strong relationship in the Twin Cities between the racial 
composition of a neighborhood and the distribution of applications across prime, near prime and 
subprime lenders. Applicants are less likely to access prime lenders when attempting to acquire 
or refinance homes in neighborhoods with larger shares of people of color than in white 
neighborhoods, and they are less likely to do so regardless of the race or income of the applicant.  
 
Table 4 shows that in predominately white neighborhoods (neighborhoods that are less than 30 
percent people of color) 72 percent of all loan applications are made to prime home purchase 
lenders. This is significantly greater than the 52 percent of applications in integrated 
neighborhoods (with 30 to 49 percent people of color) and 34 percent of applications in 
segregated non-white neighborhoods (with 50 percent or more people of color).  
 
The differences are also evident for refinance applicantions. As the racial composition of the 
neighborhood shifts towards greater shares of people of color, the application rates at prime 
lenders drop, regardless of the race and income of the applicant.  
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Both people of color and whites are less likely to apply with prime lenders when applying for 
loans in integrated or segregated non-white neighborhoods. For home purchases, the prime 
lender application rate for whites is highest in predominately white neighborhoods at 78 percent, 
dropping to 69 percent in integrated neighborhoods, and 55 percent in segregated non-white 
neighborhoods. Similarly, the prime lender application rate for people of color is highest in 
predominately white neighborhoods at 49 percent, dropping to 29 percent in integrated 
neighborhoods and to 22 percent in segregated non-white neighborhoods. The pattern is similar 
for refinance loans. 
 
Table 4 also shows that the relationship between access to prime lenders and the racial 
composition of the neighborhood cannot be explained simply by the income mix of the 
neighborhoods. If that were the case, prime lender application rates for applicants of a given race 
and income would be the same in all neighborhoods—e.g. high income whites would apply for 
prime loans at the same rate regardless of their neighborhood type. In fact, high and very high 
income whites and people of color show significant drops in prime lender application rates as the 
share of people of color in a neighborhood increases. This shows that even high-income whites 
face obstacles to acquiring prime loans in high-minority neighborhoods.57 
 
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2004-2006 HMDA; 2000 U.S. Census 
Bureau 
 
It is likely that the lack of prime lender branch locations in diverse and segregated 
neighborhoods (see Table 2) makes it more difficult for all types of applicants to apply to prime 
lenders. However, it is worth reiterating that differences by race are substantial regardless of the 
neighborhood type—applicants of color are much less likely than whites to access prime lenders, 
regardless of the racial composition of the neighborhood.  
 
                                                 
57 Statistical analysis of denial rates also shows that loan denial rates are higher in high-minority neighborhoods 
even after controlling for the race and income of the applicant, the loan amount, the lender type (prime or not), 
gender of the applicant and neighborhood income. 
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Lending Patterns in North Minneapolis 
North Minneapolis is the area hardest hit by the foreclosure crisis in the Twin Cities.58 While 
about two units for every hundred owner units in Hennepin and Ramsey Counties experienced 
foreclosure, the rate was about twelve units for every hundred North Minneapolis units. It is also 
the most segregated and lowest-income area in the Twin Cities. Seventy percent of North 
Minneapolis residents are people of color, while in the Twin Cities metro as a whole, people of 
color represent just 15 percent of the population. Not surprisingly, home buyers and refinancers 
in North Minneapolis received a large number of subprime loans. 
 
Different types of lenders had very different lending patterns in North Minneapolis than they did 
in the rest of the Twin Cities region. Many prime lenders were less likely to issue any sort of 
loan in North Minneapolis, while many subprime lenders were disproportionately active on the 
Northside. 
 
1.7 percent of all home purchase loans and 2.0 percent of refinancing loans in the Twin Cities 
were issued to borrowers in North Minneapolis. Forty-nine percent of these North Minneapolis 
home purchase loans were subprime, while 47 percent of refinance loans were subprime. In the 
rest of the metropolitan area, just 14 percent of home purchase loans and 20 percent of 
refinancing loans were subprime. In other words, a home purchase loan for a Northside property 
was 3.6 times more likely to be subprime than a loan for a home located elsewhere in the Twin 
Cities metropolitan area. Likewise, a refinancing loan for a home located in North Minneapolis 
was 2.3 time more likely to be subprime than a refinancing loan located elsewhere in the Twin 
Cities. 
 
Many subprime lenders did a disproportionate amount of their lending in North Minneapolis, 
while many prime lenders did very little lending in North Minneapolis. Table 5 shows lending 
patterns for each of the three lending categories. The percentage of prime lender loans that went 
to North Minneapolis was easily the lowest—0.8 percent compared to 1.7 for all lenders, 2.5 
percent for near-prime lenders and 6.7 percent for subprime lenders. For example, the region’s 
largest prime lender, Wells Fargo Bank, NA, made just 286 of its home purchase loans in North 
Minneapolis out of a regional total of 35,272. If North Minneapolis had received a proportionate 
amount of Well Fargo’s loans, it would have received more than twice as many loans—1.7 
percent or a total of 616 loans. 
 
Likewise, among other large prime lenders, CitiMortgage made 11 of its 1,375 loans in North 
Minneapolis (0.8 percent); Voyager Bank made 10 of its 1,616 Twin Cities Loans in North 
Minneapolis (0.8 percent); and PHH Mortgage made 49 of its 6,751 loans on the Northside (0.7 
percent). These lenders, along with most other large scale prime lenders were disproportionately 
absent from North Minneapolis loan records. Indeed, several medium-to-large-scale prime 
lenders made no home loans at all in North Minneapolis: DHI mortgage Co. (1,731 total loans), 
Ryland Mortgage Company (1,054 total loans), Universal America Mortgage Co. LLC (2,322 
total loans), and Xpulte Mortgage, LLC (1,112 total loans). 
 
 
                                                 
58 For the purposes of this work, Minneapolis’ Northside was defined as the census tracts that were completely or 
mostly contained in zip codes 55411 and 55412, the area most often used in studies of the Northside. 
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Table 5: Home Purchase Loan Rates in North Minneapolis for 
Prime, Near Prime and Subprime Lenders 
    
 Total Metro North Mpls. % North 
 Loans Loans Mpls. 
    
All Prime Lenders 118,288   990 0.8 
   
All Near Prime Lenders   21,221   537 2.5 
  
All Subprime Lenders   18,350 1,231 6.7 
  
All Lenders 157,859 2,758 1.7 
  
Totals include only banks with 25 or more loans. 
 
Conversely, most of the Twin Cities’ large subprime lenders made a disproportionately large 
number of loans in North Minneapolis. For example, BNC mortgage made 10.8 percent of its 
loans on the Northside (196 out of 1,821 loans), while Long Beach Mortgage Company made 
12.2 percent of its loans on the Northside (63 of 516 loans)—compared to 6.7 percent of loans 
for subprime lenders overall and 1.7 percent of loans for all lenders.59 
 
This data does not prove that certain prime lenders redlined North Minneapolis or that certain 
subprime lenders targeted North Minneapolis. Nor does this pattern implicate all lenders in the 
region. Indeed, several banks, including Twin Cities Financial (TCF), made a disproportionate 
number of prime loans in North Minneapolis. Overall, however, the pattern shows that subprime 
lenders did a disproportionate amount of their total lending in this racially isolated community, 
while most prime lenders extended little or no credit to Northside homebuyers and refinancers.  
 
B.  Race, Subprime Lending and Foreclosures 
 
Subprime and predatory loans often lack transparency, have little oversight and accountability 
and are often unsustainable, which leads to foreclosure. Mortgage foreclosures are costly both to 
individual homeowners and to their communities. For instance, researchers in Chicago measured 
the impact of foreclosures on neighboring properties from 1997 to 1999. The estimate was that 
each conventional single family foreclosure resulted in a 0.9 percent decrease in the value of 
homes within 1/8 mile of the foreclosure. For the City of Chicago this equated to a loss of $598 
million dollars in single family property values—a $159,000 loss to neighboring homes per 
foreclosure.60 Re-scaling this estimate for Minneapolis and St. Paul in more recent years suggests 
that foreclosures in 2007 alone resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in lost tax base in each 
city and a loss of roughly 2.5 percent of property tax revenues.61 
                                                 
59 A similar pattern exists in the refinancing market, although the disparities are somewhat less extreme. 
60 Immergluck and Smith, 2006. 
61 This calculation assumes that home values in Minneapolis and St. Paul were 85 and 77 percent of those in 
Chicago (reflecting median values reported in 2005-2007 by the Census); that values increased from 1999 to 2007 
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Borrowers who face foreclosures have difficulty making ends meet and cumulatively put great 
pressure on the broader community. As Engel and McCoy (2008) note:  
 
As borrowers struggle with unmanageable monthly loan payments or lose their homes, 
cities may also experience a greater demand for social welfare programs. More residents 
may turn to cities for assistance with heating costs, food and shelter. The education 
system can feel the effect as well. When children loose their homes, they often switch 
schools, which strains urban school systems that are already strapped for resources.62 
 
Nationally, foreclosures increased 55 percent between 2005 and 2007. Subprime loans 
contributed to over two-thirds of the growth.63 The lending disparities by race and location 
revealed in the prior section are bound to mean that the costs of the foreclosure crisis still at work 
in the U.S. and the Twin Cities will be borne very unevenly. Not surprisingly, the effects have 
been greatest on communities of color. There is a strong relationship in Hennepin and Ramsey 
county neighborhoods between mortgage foreclosures, subprime lending and borrowers of color. 
 
Maps 3 through 6 show this very clearly in the core of the region within Hennepin and Ramsey 
counties. Map 3 shows the location of sheriff's foreclosure sales in 2007. Minneapolis has the 
largest number of foreclosures, followed by St. Paul and the inner suburbs of Brooklyn Park and 
Brooklyn Center. The largest cluster of foreclosures is in North Minneapolis. 
 
Map 4 shows that the areas with the most foreclosures are also areas where most mortgage 
holders are people of color. The neighborhoods with the highest percentages of mortgages held 
by people of color are in parts of Minneapolis, St. Paul, Brooklyn Park, Brooklyn Center and 
Richfield. The largest concentration, where over half the borrowers are people of color, is in 
North Minneapolis, the neighborhood with the greatest concentration of foreclosures. 
 
Subprime loans are also most concentrated in neighborhoods with high percentages of people of 
color (Map 5). Various inner city neighborhoods, as well as parts of Brooklyn Center, Brooklyn 
Park and Richfield show high rates of subprime lending. North Minneapolis and neighborhoods 
that surround downtown Saint Paul have subprime lending rates that exceed 37 percent of all 
loans.  
 
Map 6 shows foreclosure rates per 100 owner occupied housing units. As expected, the census 
tracts with the highest percentages of people of color and the highest subprime lending rates are 
also the tracts where foreclosure rates were the highest. Foreclosures rates were particularly high  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
by roughly 100 percent (which is the increase in median values reported by the Census from 1999 though 2005-
2007); and that effective municipal tax rates (taxes as a percent of market value) were 0.62 percent in Minneapolis 
and 0.32 percent in St. Paul (reflecting taxes on a median valued home). With these assumptions, the 2,943 
foreclosures that occurred in Minneapolis in 2007 would have resulted in $814 million in lost tax base and $10.7 in 
lost property tax revenues in total and $5.1million for the city government alone. The equivalent figures for the 
1,928 foreclosures in St. Paul are $483 million in lost tax base and $5.2 million in lost revenues in total and $1.5 
million for the city government alone. 
62 Engel and McCoy 2008, 101. 
63 Wood, 2007, 23-24. 
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Map 3: HENNEPIN - RAMSEY COUNTIESSheriff Foreclosure Salesby Address Location, 2007
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!! 1 dot = 1 Foreclosure                Sale 
Cities with most foreclosures:
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Map 4: HENNEPIN - RAMSEY COUNTIESPercentage of Mortgage Loans Acquired byPeople of Color by Census Tracts, 2004-2006
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Counties V lue:  17.6%
Note:  Census Tracts with "No data" hadfewer than 25 mortgage borrowers.
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12.6%
17.5%
33.4%
50.6%
8.1%
50.7   to 94.3%
People of Color include all borrowersexcept non-Hispanic whites.Only conventional first-lien mortgage loans for owner-occupied, 1-4 family unit homes are used for the calculation of the rates.  Mortgages purchased by institutions were not included in the calculation.
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Map 5: HENNEPIN - RAMSEY COUNTIESPercentage of Mortgage Loans that areSubprime by Census Tracts, 2004-2006
94
¡¢94
¡¢394
£¤169
£¤52
£¤10
£¤10
£¤169
Miles
0 5 10
$
Legend
Counties Value:  17.6%
Note:  Census Tracts with "No data" hadfewer than 25 mortgage borrowers.
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Subprime loans are mortgages that are 3 percentage points above treasury rate.Only conventional first-lien mortgage loans for owner-occupied, 1-4 family unit homes are used for the calculation of the rates.  Mortg ges purchased by institutions were not included in the calculation.
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in North Minneapolis, where, in many areas, there was more than one foreclosure for every 10 
owner-occupied units. 
  
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2004-2006 HMDA; 
Hennepin and Ramsey County Sheriffs' Offices, 2007 
 
 
Chart 7 shows the relationship between race and foreclosures in another way. The diagram 
shows just how closely foreclosure rates track minority shares in Hennepin and Ramsey county 
neighborhoods. Foreclosure rates are clearly higher in neighborhoods where more borrowers are 
people of color. Even more striking is how much more dramatically foreclosure rates increase 
once the non-white share reaches 50 percent. The data show that the expected difference in the 
foreclosure rates associated with neighborhoods at 20 percent non-white and 40 percent non-
white is just one or two points, but that the expected difference in neighborhoods at 50 and 70 
percent non-white is more than 10 points.64 
 
Chart 8 shows a similar relationship between foreclosure rates and subprime lending. 
Neighborhoods with greater subprime lending rates show greater foreclosure rates and 
foreclosure rates increase much more rapidly at subprime rates above 40 or 50 percent. The 
expected difference in foreclosure rates associated with neighborhoods at 10 and 30 percent 
subprime rates is just a point or two, while the difference for neighborhoods with 40 and 60 
percent subprime lending rates is about 20 points.65  
 
                                                 
64 The correlation coefficient for the exponential relationship shown in Chart 7 is .76, which is statistically 
significant at the 99 percent confidence level. 
65 The correlation coefficient for the exponential relationship in Chart 8 is .81, statistically significant at the 99 
percent confidence level.  
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The clear implication of Charts 7 and 8 is that the ultimate costs of the lending crisis in the Twin 
Cities are being borne disproportionately by communities of color. Non-white loan applicants are 
substantially more likely than white applicants to be saddled with the greater costs associated 
with near-prime and subprime loans, regardless of their income. This increases the chances that 
they and the neighborhoods they live in will face the extremely disruptive effects of foreclosures. 
In other words, the costs of the crisis are focused, in many cases, on the people and 
neighborhoods least able to bear them. 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2004-2006 HMDA; 
Hennepin and Ramsey County Sheriffs' Offices, 2007 
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IV.  Fair Housing: Mortgage Market Participants’ Responsibilities  
  
While some of the racial disparity in lending described in the previous section may be related to 
nondiscriminatory market forces, the fact remains that large racial disparities in lending should 
not exist. Years of housing discrimination and redlining led to an impressive body of anti-
discrimination law, most of which applies to mortgage discrimination, including the Fair 
Housing Act and the Community Reinvestment Act. The lending patterns discussed in Section 
III of this report should not surprise lenders. Banks are regularly required to review and report 
their lending patterns. Moreover, the long reach of fair lending law holds all mortgage market 
participants who knowingly engaged in, encouraged, or profited from discriminatory lending 
practices responsible for the damage done to communities and individuals. There is no reason 
that a properly motivated HUD, FFIEC, and Justice department cannot enforce fair lending law 
and take significant steps to eliminate inequalities in mortgage markets. Yet, despite expansive 
laws prohibiting racial discrimination in all parts of the mortgage and home buying process and 
the lenders’ knowledge of those lending patterns, racial discrimination seems to continue.  
 
A. Mortgage Discrimination Law 
 
While regulation of mortgage market participants is complex and often byzantine, civil rights 
law governing fair lending can be applied to market participants in a straightforward manner. 
Discrimination under federal fair housing law is more expansive than what the public often 
assumes. It includes both intentional discrimination and the unnecessary discriminatory effects of 
otherwise neutral actions. Aggressive federal and private enforcement of existing fair lending 
laws is the first step to ending racially discriminatory lending.  
 
Mortgage market participants violate the Fair Housing Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 
and Sections 1981 and 1982 of the Civil Rights Acts when their actions make housing, credit, or 
contract rights unavailable because of the plaintiff’s protected class.66 Congress gives protected 
classes statutory protection against discrimination. Under the Fair Housing Act, Congress 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of a person’s race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial 
status, and national origin.67  
 
Federal and state consumer protection laws, along with the common law of contracts and torts, 
prohibit fraudulent and some predatory lending practices.68 The Fair Housing Act prohibits 
discrimination against individuals or classes of individuals seeking mortgage loans.69 For 
example, the Fair Housing Act prohibits banks and brokers from targeting communities of color 
for subprime or predatory loans. The Community Reinvestment Act, on the other hand, is 
supposed to address access to credit. The Community Revitalization Act was created to ensure 
                                                 
66 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006); 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908; See Schemm, 1995.  
67 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606, 3617. Federal and state consumer protection laws, along with the common law of 
contracts and torts, prohibit fraudulent lending and some predatory lending practices. 
68 Although consumer protection is a large part of the predatory lending story, this Report focuses on the incidence 
of racial discrimination in lending. 
69 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606, 3617. Federal and state consumer protection laws, along with the common law of 
contracts and torts, prohibit fraudulent lending and some predatory lending practices. 
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all communities have equal access to credit, directing banks to “meet the credit needs of the local 
communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation of such 
institutions.”70 
 
While secondary market participants, such as the bundlers and sellers of repackaged subprime 
loans, may feel divorced from the on-the-ground-discriminatory practices of brokers and banks, 
they can, nonetheless, be held responsible for them. The Fair Housing Act and other civil rights 
law prohibit (secondary actors) from condoning or knowingly profiting from housing or 
mortgage discrimination. Civil rights law prohibiting housing discrimination and unfair lending 
extends liability to secondary mortgage market participants.71 The rationale for the liability is 
that if the secondary market actors created incentives for the sale of discriminatory loans or 
knowingly profited from them, the market participation created conditions that furthered 
discrimination.72 
 
Enforcement of Fair Lending Laws 
The United States Justice Department and federal regulatory agencies, such as HUD and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), have the duty to enforce fair lending and fair 
housing laws.73 Federal government diligence in enforcing fair lending laws varies, of course, 
from administration to administration. In the face of federal inaction, however, individuals 
usually have the right to file lawsuits challenging mortgage market discrimination. In 2008, 
individuals and groups representing individuals, such as the NAACP, sued mortgage brokers, 
lenders, and secondary market actors for the discriminatory effects of their conduct. Individuals, 
however, do not have the ability to file suit to ensure equal access to credit under the Community 
Reinvestment Act. 
While federal regulation and enforcement of fair lending may be a more efficient method of 
ensuring equal access to credit, individual liability may deter mortgage market participants from 
engaging in discriminatory lending practices. Holding individual market participants responsible 
for their participation in discriminatory patterns, however, is a complex problem. Because of the 
exponential grown in non-traditional lending, finding and punishing the party to blame for 
lending discrimination is no longer a simple matter. 
Multiple parties are responsible for marketing loan products, issuing loans, and offsetting the 
terms of loans. Therefore, multiple parties must be held responsible for racial disparities in 
mortgage lending. As the foreclosure crisis has escalated, numerous plaintiffs have filed suit 
against mortgage market participants. Examples of how individual lawsuits have sought to hold 
mortgage market participants accountable for unfair lending follow.  
 
                                                 
7012 U.S.C § 2901.  
71 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006); 24 C.F.R. § 100.125(b) (2007); 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(l), 
Official Staff Commentary § 202.2(l). Secondary mortgage market participants can violate civil rights laws by 
condoning the racially discriminatory practices of primary market actors and with discriminatory loan purchase 
restrictions. Ibid.  
72 See Sandler et. al. 
73 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608-3614; 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (c). 
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Legal Standards for Lending Discrimination: Intentional Discrimination and Disparate 
Impact 
 
Civil rights law does not require proof of racial animosity to find discriminatory behavior. The 
law instead requires proof of either intentional discrimination or disparate impact.  
 
To prove intentional discrimination, the plaintiff must show that the lender discriminated on 
the basis of a protected class, status, such as race and religion and that that discrimination 
damaged her.74 The intentional discrimination does not have to be based in racial hatred, 
targeting minorities for high-cost mortgage sales is intentional discrimination.75  
 
To prove disparate impact, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s actions adversely 
affect a disproportionate number of people of a protected class. The burden of proof then shifts 
to the defendant to show that her actions were a business necessity. This standard has two 
prongs: the defendant must show that the action was bona fide and legitimate and that no other 
less-discriminatory action would achieve the same business need.76 Intent is irrelevant in 
disparate impact cases, the plaintiff, instead shows that the defendant’s action had an inexcusable 
discriminatory effect.77 
 
Some federal circuit courts have set separate burden shifting frameworks for “reverse redlining,” 
or racially targeted predatory lending cases, but courts have not adopted a universal standard, 
although all circuits recognize that the action is illegal.78   
 
                                                 
74 To show intentional discrimination the plaintiff does not need to be a member of a protected class, she merely 
needs to have suffered damage because of the defendant’s intentional discrimination against a protected class. 
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1983). 
75 Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corporation, 140 F.Supp.2d 7, 20-22 (D.D.C.2000) Matthews v. New 
Century Mortgage Corp., 185 F.Supp.2d 874, 887 (S.D.Ohio 2002). 
76 N.A.A.C.P. v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2nd. Cir. 1988); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 
(D. Penn. 1977). Although the Supreme Court has not decided that disparate impact violates the Fair Housing Act  
or the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, every circuit has held that they can. Ibid. Courts distinguish disparate treatment 
cases, subject to the McDonnell Douglas framework, from disparate impact cases. Some courts, inevitably confuse 
the two, and allow/require to plaintiff to take a third step and prove that the defendant’s explanation is pretext. In all 
cases, however, courts recognize that the standard is business necessity, which requires a showing of necessity, 
rather than simply showing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision. See Marbly v. Home Properties 
of New York, 205 F.Supp.2d 736 (D. Mich, 2002) (requiring the defendant to prove necessity, even though the court 
uses the McDonald-Douglas framework). A plaintiff can use statistical evidence to show disparate impact. 
Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep't, 352 F.3d 565, 575-76 (2d Cir.2003). 
77 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 988 (1987). 
78 See, for example, Wiltshire v. Dhanraj,“[T]o establish a prima facie case of [reverse redlining] discrimination ..., 
the plaintiff must show: (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she applied for and was qualified for 
loans; (3) that the loans were given on grossly unfavorable terms; and (4) that the lender continues to provide loans 
to other applicants with similar qualifications, but on significantly more favorable terms. [citation omitted] In the 
alternative, if the plaintiff presents direct evidence that the lender intentionally targeted her for unfair loans on the 
basis of sex and marital status, the plaintiff need not also show that the lender makes loans on more favorable terms 
to others.” 421 F.Supp.2d 544, 554 (D.N.Y. 2005). 
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B. Regulation of Mortgage Market Participants 
 
Mortgage Brokers 
State laws directly regulate mortgage brokers, this means that state oversight of brokers varies 
tremendously. Some states, such as Minnesota, require registration and prohibit certain types of 
lending, while others have virtually no regulation. Mortgage brokers are, nonetheless, 
unquestionably subject to federal and state fair housing laws.  
 
Mortgage brokers often make the on-the-ground decisions that result in racial disparities, and, 
thus, are frequent targets for lawsuits alleging lending discrimination, particularly in the area of 
predatory lending or reverse redlining. For example, in Ware v. Indymac Bank, a recent federal 
lawsuit in Illinois alleges racial discrimination where plaintiffs were contacted by a broker who 
enticed them to refinance their home. The plaintiffs, Carter and Thelma Ware, alleged that the 
mortgage broker, Homestart Mortgage Corporation, falsified loan documentation, issued a loan 
that was unnecessarily expensive, and made that loan on less favorable terms than it made loans 
to white individuals. The discriminatory action made it more difficult for the Wares to refinance 
their loan in order to escape the loan’s predatory terms and eventual foreclosure.79 These 
allegations, if proven, would make the mortgagee broker in violation of the Fair Housing Act 
(discriminating in the terms of credit available for home refinance), the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act (discriminating in an aspect of a credit transaction), state consumer protection laws (Illinois 
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act), and federal consumer protection laws (the Truth in 
Lending Act). 
 
Loan Originators 
Loan originators, are directly regulated by either state or federal laws, depending on whether 
they are state or federally chartered. A recent Supreme Court case, Watters v. Wachovia, exempts 
federally chartered banks and banking institutions from state consumer protection laws, but does 
not hold that federal law preempts state civil rights laws.80 Therefore, both state and federal civil 
right laws, including the Fair Housing Act and its progeny regulate loan originators.  
 
Loan originators can violate civil rights laws either by directly making discriminatory decisions 
or by knowingly creating incentives for brokers to engage in unfair or racially targeted lending. 
For example, in the above case, Ware v. Indymac Bank, the plaintiffs alleged that the bank, 
Indymac issued a yield spread premium81 to the Wares’ mortgage broker, which it knew had a 
discriminatory impact, violating the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.82 
Likewise, in Buycks-Roberson v. Citibank, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
granted class-action certification to African Americans plaintiffs, alleging violations of the Fair 
                                                 
79 534 F.Supp.2d 835 (N. D. Ill. 2008). 
80 127 S.Ct. 1559 (2007). 
81 A yield spread premium is a payment (often a cash bonus) made to a mortgage broker for selling a mortgage with 
a higher interest rate than the borrower qualified for from the wholesale lender. While yield spread premiums can 
serve a legitimate purpose, paying the broker for his or her services, the premiums can also incentivize pushing very 
expensive loans on inexperienced and vulnerable people such as people of color, women, and seniors. Moreover, 
since the premiums are not disclosed upfront, people do not know that they are not getting the best interest rate 
available to them. See Center for Responsible Lending, (2004) Yield Spread Premiums: A Powerful Incentive for 
Equity Theft. 
82 534 F.Supp.2d 835 (N.D.Ill. 2008). 
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Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The court held that these high-income 
African American plaintiffs who were denied home loans because of the subjective application 
of Citibank’s neutral underwriting criteria could show Citibank’s liability by showing both their 
own qualifications for home loans and the statistical disparity between loans denied to white 
applicants and black applicants and the disparities between applicants in different neighborhoods 
or census tracts.83  
 
Similarly, in Hargraves v. Capital City, the District Court for the District of Columbia held that 
reverse-redlining constituted a violation of the Fair Housing Act.84 Specifically, the court held 
that racially targeted predatory lending violated the provision of the Fair Housing Act that made 
it illegal to “refus[e] to sell…or otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to a person 
because of race, color” because predatory lending “can make housing unavailable by putting 
borrowers at risk of losing the property which secures the loans.”85 The Hargraves plaintiffs 
produced data showing that Capital City Mortgage, a subprime lender, directed most of its 
lending and loan marketing towards borrowers and home owners in segregated, African 
American neighbors because they believed African Americans living in segregated 
neighborhoods to be unsophisticated or financially desperate and therefore more susceptible to 
their fraudulent lending practices.86 The court in Hargraves did not require the plaintiffs to show 
that the bank treated white borrowers better than African American borrowers, just that the bank 
lent so disproportionately in African American neighborhoods to amount to targeting and that 
these loans were made on grossly disadvantageous terms.87  
 
Secondary Market Participants 
Federal laws directly regulate most secondary market participants, preempting state regulations. 
This makes it harder for states to control the actions of these secondary market participants 
through regulation. This does not mean that secondary market participants cannot be held liable 
for their participation in discriminatory lending; civil rights laws are applicable to their conduct. 
Federal antidiscrimination law holds these secondary market participants liable for condoning 
discrimination in the primary market, which the participant could do by purchasing loans issued 
by a lender or broker that it knows or should know engaged in racial discrimination in lending.88 
 
For example, the now defunct Bear Sterns investment bank, a secondary market participant, has 
recently been sued over its participation in discrimination against minority borrowers. Bear 
Stearns is accused of engaging in racially discriminatory predatory lending, in violation of the 
Fair Housing Act, through its purchase of loans made by a subprime subsidiary. The subsidiary 
had profit sharing methods that encouraged brokers to target racial minorities with predatory 
                                                 
83 Ibid.  
84 Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp.,140 F.Supp.2d 7, 20 (D.D.C. 2000). 
85 In Hargraves, the plaintiffs avoided summary judgment by alleging that the terms and conditions of the loans 
made to African Americans were unfair and predatory and that the defendants were targeted on the basis of race. 
Ibidat 21.  
86 See Brief Of The United States As Amicus Curiae In Support Of Plaintiffs' Opposition To Defendants' Motion For 
Judgment On The Pleadings Or, In The Alternative, For Summary Judgment, No. 98-1021, March 2000.  
87 Hargraves v. Capital City Corp., 140 F. Supp.2d 7, 21 (D.D.C. 2000). 
88 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006); 24 C.F.R. § 100.125(b) (2007); 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(l), 
Official Staff Commentary § 202.2(l). 
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loan products.89 Bear Sterns is also accused of seeking out subprime loans, encouraging rampant 
subprime lending in communities of color, and then subjecting these primarily black and Latino 
borrowers to predatory servicing agreements.90  
 
 
V.  The Regulation and Enforcement of Civil Rights Law in Mortgage 
 Lending 
 
While inadequate regulation of mortgage brokers and new lending tools allowed the market to 
engage in unsafe and unfair lending practices, the failure to effectively enforce fair lending laws 
allowed predatory lending and the ensuing foreclosure crisis to disparately impact communities 
of color. The federal and state governments have not enforced fair lending laws, allowing lenders 
to engage in illegal discriminatory behavior with little threat of punishment. Further, the 
response to the escalating foreclosures in communities of color has been scattershot. While states 
have banded together to get the worst of the worse subprime lenders, there has been little 
concerted action to make the entire industry accountable for what is an industry-wide problem. 
When the last round of redlining was uncovered, Congress passed numerous laws expanding 
lenders’ fair lending responsibilities and reporting requirements. The laws imposed fair lending 
conditions on the entire industry – an appropriate remedy to an industry-wide problem. There is a 
similar need today to hold the entire industry responsible for solving the problem of credit access 
in impacted communities of color.   
 
Twentieth Century Law in a Twenty-first Century Market 
 
As the mortgage market became multilayered and immensely more complicated, lending 
regulations remained the same. Federal regulations essentially assume that banks will not issue 
mortgages likely to result in foreclosure because banks traditionally took a loss when a loan 
issued by the bank defaulted. This assumption, clearly, is no longer true in a market that 
encourages the rapid resale and securitization of loans. For example, the Fair Debt Collection 
Protection Act sets the standard for debt collectors, prohibiting harassment, misleading 
representation, and forbidding threats of foreclosure when there is no legal right of foreclosure.91 
This consumer protection is not applicable to servicers of mortgages that are not in default.92 
 
Today, loan servicers93 are almost never the creditor, much less the originator of the loan. And 
servicers today make their money in much the same way as other professional debt collection 
agencies; they enforce loan contracts, collecting payments from debtors. However, loan servicers 
are not regulated to the same degree as traditional debt collection agencies, creating greater 
                                                 
89 Complaint, Rodriguez v. Bear Sterns, CV 1816 (D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2007). 
90 Ibid at 11. 
91 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p. 
92 United States v. Fairbanks Capital Corp, 2004 WL 3322609 (D. Mass. 2004). When the law was enacted, most 
loan servicers were the same party that originated the loan, meaning that most consumers picked their servicer. 
93 Loan servicers are the entities that collect mortgage payments from borrowers and manage escrow accounts. 
While servicers notify the holder of a mortgage loan if the loan goes into default and impose late fees, servicers have 
little power over the actual terms of the loan and can rarely modify the terms of the loan.  
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potential for them to engage in harassing and misleading behavior.94 For example, servicers can 
often “pyramid” late fees, which results in a borrower paying many months of late fees after only 
one late mortgage payment.95 Likewise, the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) only makes creditors 
and assignees of creditors liable for violations of the act. Assignees are only liable if the illegal 
disclosure is apparent on the face of the mortgage contract. Loan sellers (brokers), underwriters, 
and trustees, the entities that engineer the terms of the loan, are unaccountable under TILA.96  
 
Securitization has led to opaque business structures, complicating paper trails and leaving 
consumers unaware of who actually owns their loan.97 The advent of electronic mortgage 
recording systems, the Mortgage Electronic Recording System (MERS, Inc) in particular, as 
“nominee of record” on county property records makes public real estate records nearly useless 
in attempting to track mortgage transactions. Moreover, borrowers who have experienced unfair 
and illegal lending are often unable to identify the chain of ownership of their mortgage. This 
makes it difficult to access their records and impose liability on mortgage market participants. 
  
The securitization and deregulation of the mortgage lending industry has created a market that 
would have been unrecognizable to the legislatures that drafted fair lending laws. As the market 
evolved, fair lending laws and the enforcement of those laws ought to have kept pace, making 
sure that a changing market did not open up room for abusive lending practices. Today, the Twin 
Cities region, along with the rest of the country is facing a foreclosure crisis—and communities 
of color, like North Minneapolis, are bearing the brunt of the crisis. While the modernization and 
enforcement of fair lending laws would probably not have completely averted the crisis, it would 
have softened the blow to communities of color and made inroads towards a fairer and more just 
housing market.  
 
The Federal Failure to Enforce Fair Lending Laws 
While federal agencies have the responsibility to monitor fair lending activity and to investigate 
and enforce fair lending laws, there was little proactive investigation of discrimination in 
mortgage lending from 2000 to 2008.98 Although the Clinton administration oversaw changes in 
the lending industry and a roll back of mortgage market oversight, it also initiated a number of 
high profile investigations and lawsuits against discriminatory lenders.99 In contrast, the Bush 
administration oversaw an immediate decline in the federal enforcement of fair housing laws.100 
That decline continues.101 Today, HUD no longer even staffs a fair housing administrative law 
judge; these cases are now heard by a different department’s administrative law judge.102 In the 
absence of federal enforcement of fair lending laws, mortgage market participants have little 
reason to fear getting caught in a discriminatory act, and even if they are caught, they pay a small 
price for their actions.103  
                                                 
94 Servicers are considered debt collectors under the FDCPA after the loan goes into default.  
95 Eggert, 2004, 756-761. 
96 Peterson, 2007, 2185, 2259. 
97 Peterson, 2007, 2185, 2265.  
98 National Fair Housing Alliance, 2008, 46-63. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid 54. 
101 Ibid. 
102 National Community Reinvestment Coalition 2002, 54. 
103 National Fair Housing Alliance 2008, 3-4, 47, 46-50. 
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The Scattershot Approach: Private Action Against Discriminatory Lending 
In the face of federal inaction, fair housing advocates, along with homeowners facing foreclosure 
as a result of predatory lending, have brought numerous lawsuits against mortgage market 
participants. Plaintiffs across the United States have filed complaints of racially discriminatory 
lending practices against many of the Twin Cities’ top prime and subprime lenders, including 
Countrywide Financial, Decision One Mortgage, Ameriquest Mortgage Company, Wells Fargo 
Bank, Option One Mortgage Company, Long Beach Mortgage Company, BNC Mortgage, 
Encore Credit Corporation, Accredited Home Lenders, GMAC, and Fieldstone Mortgage 
Company.104  
  
Bear Stearns, the defunct investment bank, was sued for discriminating against minority 
borrowers through its secondary market participation.105 Bear Stearns was accused of engaging 
in racially discriminatory predatory lending through its purchase of loans made by a subprime 
subsidiary, which had profit sharing methods that encouraged brokers to target racial minorities 
with predatory loan products.106 Encore Credit, now Bear Stearns Residential Mortgage, was 
another subprime arm of the Bear Stearns investment bank and was a major subprime lender and 
refinancer in the Twin Cities area. 
  
Nationally, plaintiffs have filed numerous complaints alleging that lenders engaged in a two-
tiered system of lending. Loans issued from bank storefronts were predominantly prime loans on 
good terms, issued primarily to white homebuyers and refinancers. Loans obtained from 
mortgage brokers are much more likely to be subprime and contain predatory terms, such as 
ballooning interest rates, prepayment penalties, and high loan origination costs. Brokers 
disproportionately made these loans to people of color. Banks encouraged brokers to engage in 
predatory lending behavior by sharing profits for high cost loans, encouraging brokers to sell 
subprime or predatory loans to applicants who were otherwise eligible for prime-rate loans.107 
  
While private parties have filed a skyrocketing number of lawsuits alleging discriminatory 
lending, a far greater number of wronged mortgage borrowers never assert claims against 
mortgage market participants because of the high cost of litigation. Securitized lending has only 
made fair lending lawsuits more expensive. Opaque lending structures make it difficult or 
impossible for consumers to identify the entity that owned, processed, or securitized their 
loans.108 Moreover, the sheer number of entities involved in mortgage market transactions means 
that the basic requirements of civil procedure, services of process, depositions, and 
                                                 
104 Complaint, Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, LO 08CV-062 (D. Mass., Jan. 8, 2008); Complaint, Allen v. 
Decision One Mort. Co., 07-11669 (D. Mass. Sept. 6, 2007); Complaint, Jones v. Long Beach Mortgage, CV 11-372 
(D. Mass. July 26, 2007); Complaint, Miller v. Countrywide Bank, 11257-RGS (D. Mass. July, 12, 2007); 
Complaint, NAACP v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., et al., SAV07-0794 (D. Cal. July 11, 2007); Complaint, NCRC v. 
Novastar, CV 00861 (D. D.C. May 9, 2007); Complaint, Tribett v. BNC Mortgage, CV 02-809 (D. Ill. May 
18.2007). 
105 Complaint, Rodriguez v. Bear Stearns, CV 1816 (D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2007). 
106 Ibid. 
107 See Complaint, Allen v. Decision One Mort. Co., No. 07-11669 (D. Mass. Sept. 6, 2007); Bocian et al., 2006; 
National Fair Housing Alliance, 2008, 23. 
108 Peterson, 2007, 2265. 
  43
interrogatories are cost-prohibitively expensive in relation to expectations of damages.109  
 
Federal agencies and the Department of Justice have the means to most effectively investigate 
violations of fair lending laws and to punish wrong-doers. While the sheer number of private 
party allegations against mortgage market participants illustrates the widespread problem of 
discriminatory lending, the scattershot approach of private action is unlikely to deal with the full 
problem. Without concerted state and federal action, most wrongs will go uncorrected and all but 
the most egregious violations of fair lending laws will go unpunished.  
 
                                                 
109 Plaintiffs have been filing suit in state courts, in an attempt to avoid the long delays and costs associated with 
federal litigation and to take advantage of state consumer protection laws. Although many states also have statutes 
prohibiting racial discrimination in lending, federal courts have been holding that federal civil rights law pre-empts 
state enforcement of fair lending laws— further complicating private enforcement of fair lending laws. Bagley, 
2004, 2274. 
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VI. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Discrimination against people of color seeking to rent, buy, and insure houses continues to be an 
endemic problem across the United States. Pair testing studies continue to show racial steering 
by realtors in home buying and discrimination in home lending.110 While overt redlining, the 
complete denial of credit to communities of color, is less prevalent than it was forty years ago, 
research shows that people of color receive home loans on worse terms and at a higher cost than 
similarly situated white borrowers.111  
 
The most recent Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data reveal strong racial disparities in 
mortgage lending in the Twin Cities. A careful analysis of the HMDA data shows that prime 
lenders are substantially more likely to deny loans to people of color, regardless of income;  
lenders are more likely to deny home loans in neighborhoods which are identifiable as 
communities of color. HMDA also shows that people of color, regardless of income, are more 
likely to submit loan applications to subprime lenders and are disproportionately receiving 
subprime loans. 
 
The magnitude of the disparities imply that credit markets in the Twin Cities treat people of 
different races differently, to the clear disadvantage of people of color. It is a problem not only of 
access to opportunity and but also of disparate treatment. Prime loans are less accessible to 
people of color and in integrated and segregated neighborhoods of color, while all parts of the 
market, prime and subprime alike, are more likely to refuse credit to applicants of color, 
regardless of their income. 
 
Mortgage lending discrimination against individuals and communities has been illegal for over 
forty years. The most basic purpose of the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1968 is to prevent racial discrimination in housing, including discrimination in mortgages 
transactions.112 The twin purpose of the Act was to remedy segregation and expand integrated 
living opportunities.113 Congress again outlawed racially discriminatory lending through the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 and directed federal banking regulators to oversee and 
enforce fair lending in low-income communities of color through the Community Reinvestment 
Act of 1977.114 Congress further created the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) in order 
for federal regulators, banks, and communities to monitor the lending practices of mortgage 
market participants.115  
 
In short, mortgage lenders should know that failure to provide credit to people and communities 
of color on fair terms is illegal. And mortgage lenders should be very aware of the content of 
                                                 
110 Turner and Ross, 2003; Turner et. al.,2002. 
111 Avery, Canner and Cook, 2005; Bocian, Ernst, and Li, 2006; Boehm, Thistle and Schlottman, 2006; Courchane, 
Surette, and Zorn, 2004, 365–92; Pennington-Cross et. al, 2000. 
112 42 U.S.C. 3601 (stating that “[i]t is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, 
fair housing throughout the United States.”). The Act specifically bans discrimination in home mortgage and 
refinancing lending. 42 U.S.C. 3605 
113 114 Cong. Rec. 2276, 3422, 9559, 9591, 2275, 2706 (remarkes of Senators Mondale and Congressmen Cellar 
and Ryan). 
114 15 U.S.C. 1691; 12 U.S.C. 2901. 
115 28 U.S.C. §§2801-2810. 
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their lending practices. Yet, the most recent HMDA data provide strong evidence of lending 
disparities that are not easily explained by income differences between groups. Likewise, it is 
very clear that prime credit is not reaching the neighborhoods that need it the most—the 
segregated, high poverty neighborhoods that the Fair Housing Act was designed to eliminate.  
 
Forty years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act, banks are still disproportionately denying 
people of color prime, affordable mortgages. Today, however, the discriminatory effects of 
traditional denial of credit to communities of color has been compounded by lenders targeting 
people and communities of color with predatory loans—loans issued on such unfavorable terms 
that buyer default is likely. 
 
Recommendations 
Simply passing consumer protection laws that ban the worst predatory practices that have 
occurred over the last ten years will not address the heart of the problem of lending and race in 
the Twin Cities. In order to ensure equality in mortgage lending, we need to first ensure access to 
fair credit and then work to end racial segregation.  
 
Fair lending, ensuring that individuals and communities of color have equal access to prime 
credit, is an essential part of protecting the wealth and mobility of communities of color. 
Strengthening and enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act and establishing Fair Housing 
Centers to monitor fair housing conditions will combat lending disparities. Likewise, reforming 
HMDA will allow researchers and community activist to more effectively monitor lending 
patterns. These suggestions are detailed below. 
 
Fair lending, however, in-and-of-itself will not end predatory practices in communities of color. 
Several prime lenders in the Twin Cities, most notably Twin Cities Financial (TCF) actually 
made a disproportionately large number of prime loans in North Minneapolis. But even 
homeowners who received loans on fair terms have been severely impacted by the foreclosure 
crisis as their homes lost equity and their neighborhoods became less stable. 
 
Likewise, consumer protection laws only go part of the way in protecting against disparate 
lending. For example, in 2007, Minnesota passed two strong laws curbing many of the predatory 
lending practices that may have driven much of the foreclosure crisis in North Minneapolis.116 In 
theory, these laws should reduce the impact of subprime and predatory lending on communities 
of color. However, limiting predatory lending does not mean that prime lenders will then start 
lending to communities of color. Racially targeted predatory lending is directly tied to the 
physical and social isolation of communities of color. These neighborhoods have historically 
                                                 
116 The first bill prohibits mortgage brokers who are licensed and regulated by the state, from equity 
stripping, making loans without regard to the borrower’s ability to pay, and churning and flipping loans. 
2007 Minn. Laws ch. 18. The law also creates a fiduciary duty on the part of the broker, requiring brokers to 
act in good faith and give borrowers loans on the best terms available. 2007 Minn. Laws ch. 18. The second 
bill prohibits both lenders and mortgage brokers from charging prepayment penalties on subprime loans, 
creates criminal penalties for mortgage fraud, and creates a private right of action to enforce most of the 
substantive provisions of Minnesota’s statutes prohibiting unfair and predatory lending. 2007 Minn. Laws 
ch. 74.  
  46
been denied credit and have been targeted by subprime lenders because of the isolation of these 
communities. 
 
Simply preventing “bad” loans in communities of color will not induce the market to make 
“good” loans. Racially and economically integrated neighborhoods are more likely to attract and 
sustain prime lenders. More bank branches in integrated neighborhoods will facilitate access to 
prime lenders and give subprime lenders market competition. Treating predatory lending as 
solely a consumer protection issue misses the larger civil rights implications of unfair lending. 
Predatory lending must be addressed as part of the larger problem of segregation and access to 
credit.  
 
In the end, the entire Twin Cities region needs to work aggressively to end segregation. 
Segregation creates concentrated poverty, makes it more difficult for people of color to access 
prime lenders, and creates easy targets for predatory lenders.  
 
Strengthen the Community Reinvestment Act. While conservative commentators have blamed 
the mortgage meltdown on the CRA, research shows that the CRA could not have been 
responsible for the lending crisis. Non-bank institutions not covered by the CRA were 
responsible for the vast majority of the increase in subprime lending. Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Chairwoman Sheila Bair testified that “only one in four higher-priced first mortgage 
loans were made by CRA-covered banks during the hey-day years of subprime mortgage 
lending. The rest were made by private independent mortgage companies and large bank 
affiliates not covered by CRA rules.”117  
 
This research shows that a good part of lending disparities in segregated communities of color is 
related to access to prime credit. People in these communities are substantially more likely to 
seek loans from subprime rather than prime lenders, regardless of their income or race. While 
some of this reluctance to seek out prime lenders may have to do with historical experiences with 
discrimination, prime lenders are underrepresented in segregated communities. Instead, non-bank 
lenders have been able to sell subprime and sometimes predatory loans in these neighborhoods 
with little competition from prime lenders.  
 
Ensuring access to CRA-covered banks, mostly prime lenders, should increase access to 
affordable, prime credit for people who live in segregated communities of color. Research shows 
that CRA banks were more likely to make prime loans in minority communities than non-
covered lending institutions.118 Further, in the fifteen largest large metropolitan regions, regions 
with higher concentrations of CRA covered banks had lower foreclosure rates those with lower 
concentrations of CRA covered banks.119  
 
People of color and people who live in segregated communities of color must have access to 
affordable credit from responsible lenders in order to build wealth and long-term economic 
stability for their families. The CRA should be expanded to monitor and regulate the lending 
patterns of non-bank lending institutions. Rigorous enforcement of an expanded CRA will help 
                                                 
117 Remarks by FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair Before the Consumer Federation of America, December 4, 2008. 
118 Traiger & Hinkley LLP. 
119 Ibid. 
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provide equal access to fair credit—a necessary first step in ensuring equal opportunity for all 
Americans. 
 
Fund a Regional Fair Housing Center. Regional Fair Housing Centers help ensure non-
discrimination in housing, rental, and home lending markets through research and advocacy. 
These centers use trained test marketers to hold realtors, landlords, and banks accountable for 
discrimination. The Twin Cities lost its fair housing center several years ago, after the center lost 
funding. Since that time, there has been no systematic testing of Twin Cities markets for 
discriminatory practices. This means that there is no Twin Cities entity that is responsible for 
consistently ensuring that brokers, banks, real estate agents, and insurers are treating people 
equally. An on-going commitment to a center of this sort is needed to ensure that the grossly 
disparate impact of the on-going crisis in the region’s housing and credit markets is not repeated 
in the future. 
 
Expand the scope of HMDA Data. HMDA data today has the greatest coverage of mortgage 
loans in the U.S. It has been improved, most recently with the inclusion of interest rates for 
higher cost loans made to borrowers. Further improvements could make it a much greater 
resource for monitoring discrimination in the mortgage market.  In particular, the data set should 
include a variety of loan characteristics and lending activities that have become increasingly 
common and that are strongly tied to mortgage outcomes.  
 
Often mortgage lending institutions claim that racial disparities in mortgage lending are due to 
the credit status of borrowers. Many studies using proprietary data have contested this 
suggestion. HMDA should include data on the credit status of borrowers so that researchers can 
determine how credit history relates to mortgage outcomes. The incoming Obama 
administration's plan to create a Homeowner Obligation Made Explicit score, a standardized 
metric for the credit-worthiness of a borrower similar to a FICO score, would be a useful data 
component for HMDA.  
 
Other loan characteristics that impact mortgage outcomes and that should be included in HMDA 
are the mortgage loan cost to home value ratio, prepayment penalty costs and information about 
points and fees. The use of mortgage brokers in the application process also strongly influences 
mortgage outcomes. HMDA should include information about whether the loan was sold by a 
mortgage broker, a correspondent, or at a retail lending location.  
 
HMDA could also be expanded by including interest rates for all loans, which would allow 
researchers to better understand differences between the prime and subprime lenders. 
Additionally, the inclusion of a unique identifier in HMDA for first and second lien loans would 
allow researchers to calculate the overall cost associated with home purchases and would help 
them examine the role that secondary liens play in mortgage outcomes. 
 
HMDA has seen a steady decrease in the reporting of race information. Racial information 
collection for HMDA is optional when mortgage forms are sent in the mail, by phone, or through 
the internet. Automated underwriting, in theory, helps remove the chance that individual face-to-
face discrimination could occur in a mortgage transaction. Yet redlining also involves the 
withholding of mortgages because of the racial composition of neighborhoods. The exclusion of 
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race data in automated applications means that individual discrimination and redlining results 
can be understated or confounded. Race data should be required in HMDA for mail, phone and 
internet applications. 
 
Secondary market institutions that do not meet HMDA requirements are also not required to 
report race. Although many secondary market participants do not make credit decisions for 
individual borrowers, they can influence the practices and policies of financial institutions that 
do in such a way that could produce disparate impacts on racial groups. Because of this, racial 
information should be included in HMDA records for all mortgages sold in the secondary 
market. 
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